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Learning from Disasters: Saxony Fights the Floods of 
the River Elbe 1784-1845 
Guido Poliwoda * 
Abstract: »Sozio-ökonomische Bewältigungsstrategien auf-
grund wiederkehrender Hochwasserkatastrophen in  
Sachsen 1784-1845«. After the millennium flood of 2002 in 
Saxony the subject of “climate change causes natural disas-
ters” does not come to rest in the media and science. This 
article investigates how a society reacts, when it is almost 
constantly struck by natural disasters. Between 1784 and 
1845 at least 12 disastrous floods happened in Saxony. The 
result thereof was a Saxon learning-genesis which is dem-
onstrated in three learning phases (1784-1800, 1800-1820 
and 1820-1845). Introductory explanations of historical as-
pects of and publications about natural disasters and high 
water research to day are provided. A theoretical framework 
on how to learn from natural disasters is attached. In the 
outlook, the Saxon learning genesis is compared to the 
study of the DKKV (Deutsches Komitee für Katastrophen-
vorsorge), “Lessons Learned” from 2003. Thereby not only 
analogies between previous and today’s disaster manage-
ment are drawn but also are underlined the more efficient 
methods and approaches of more than 200 years ago. 
Introduction 
Disasters are in great demand. The latest part of the IPCC report, published at 
the beginning of the year 2007, provided further momentum to the subject of 
“climate change causing natural disasters.” The following examination is de-
signed neither to underline nor to contest this assumption, but instead to focus 
on which historical aspects of today’s management discussion can be consid-
ered useful, if, whether or when disasters are frequent or recurrent. 
                                                             
* Address all communications to: Guido Poliwoda, Institute of History, Dept. of Economic-
Social- and Environmental History, Erlachstr. 9a, 3012 Berne, Switzerland; e-mail: 
guido.poliwoda@hist.unibe.ch. 
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Even today, research in climate and natural disasters has not truly extended 
its scientific character to accept the perceptions of social sciences. If one pe-
ruses the numerous publications in this field, the one thing that stands out is the 
imbalance between science and social science literature. Historical articles 
provide comparatively rare exceptions in this discourse. Furthermore, the his-
torical study of natural disasters lacks comparative thinking and approaches, 
through which comprehensive assertions could be made. However, one can see 
that gaps have been narrowed and loopholes diminished by diverse studies 
carried out since the 1990s not only in Switzerland (MÜLLER 2004), but also 
in France (FAVIER/ GRANET-ABISSET 1999), England (MASSARD-
GUILBAUD/ PLATT/ SCHOTT 2002), Germany (POLIWODA 2007;  
JAKUBOWSKI-TIESSEN 1992), Austria (ROHR 2004) and Spain (RODRI-
GUEZ 2003). 
One must also point out that until recently historical studies of natural disas-
ters have been capable only of delivering pieces of the mosaic depicting his-
torical opinion. Historical high water research is also but a mere piece of this 
jigsaw puzzle and the examination shall therefore attempt to present a selection 
of articles dealing mainly with high water research in Saxony. Furthermore, 
this paper shall initially present a draft theoretical framework through which 
one can learn from natural disasters. Therefore it is necessary to examine the 
terms learning step, learning process and learning evolution. Following this I 
shall outline the pertinent assumptions drawn from the sections on “learning 
from disasters.” I shall also ask whether warnings concerning global warming 
could have been provided with historical answers as a result of the Saxon learn-
ing evolution between 1784 and 1845. The main body of the examination pro-
vides an overview of the climate history between 1784 and 1845, enabling a 
presentation of the high water’s recurrent momentum, which evoked consider-
able reaction from a wide range of commercial players and levels. The decisive 
question posed by this paper will be: How does political power react, when 
society is repeatedly affected by natural disasters? 
Status of research 
Climate research and historical climatology prepared the field for the commer-
cial questions, which have been creeping into the foreground since the 1990s 
(PFISTER 1999). These aspects have been mainly investigated on the basis of 
case studies (BORST 1981, p. 529-569; MILITZER 1998). Historical catastro-
phe research (PFISTER 2002) is in the early stages of development and there is 
thus a requirement for studies on a whole range of levels. In the most recent 
papers which examine natural disasters in general, as well as those investigat-
ing the “Elbe flood” specifically, the authors criticise the fact that these sub-
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jects have been examined either in a purely scientific, or in a primarily social 
context only (WEICHSELGARTNER 2003, p. 245). 
Historical high water research 
As already said in the introduction, this chapter will present ground-breaking 
studies in historical high water research. The study “Flood response and Crisis 
Management in Western Europe” by Rosenthal and t’Hart (1998) concentrates 
on disaster management of high waters in France during 1993 and 1995, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and West Germany. References are also made to other 
European countries such as Norway and England. The internal structure of each 
chapter is conspicuous, with each one running in the sequence “before – during 
– after” the disaster, something which is sadly missing in many studies. 
Denis Coeur (2003a) has written an important study regarding the recurrent 
momentum of high waters. He extracted three marked high water periods dur-
ing the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth century for the rivers Drac and 
Isère. These periods of crises did not follow immediately one after another, 
although they did provide the French central administration with the opportu-
nity to act offensively in each case: Canal construction in the seventeenth cen-
tury, financing of dike construction after 1768 and a law on the protection of 
towns against high waters in 1858. 
Since the mid-eighteenth century the local authorities in Grenoble led an 
improved management both prior to and during disasters. After 1778 they 
drafted a catastrophe plan, which served the same aims. Coeur’s comments on 
the learning process as a result of this coping mechanism are relatively brief, 
although he does say of Grenoble that: “several times during the city history 
the fight against flooding has aroused many debates, underlying that this ques-
tion was at the heart of its territories production process” (2003b, p. 378). In 
her examination of high waters from 1834, Agnes Nienhaus (2000) was able to 
demonstrate a catalytic function for the social modernisation process. Francisco 
Jorge Rodriguez (2003) shows in his study of the Segura from the seventeenth 
to the nineteenth century that the “terrible river” could be domesticated. Like 
Nienhaus, he too demonstrates the modernisation process which arose from the 
recurrence of floods.  
In addition to these studies, Coeur (2003a; 2003b) and Rohr (2003) in par-
ticular have written papers which, together with Pfister’s anthology “Am Tag 
danach” (2002), contributed to discussions about the term “disaster culture.” 
These papers all describe the diverse reactions exhibited over the passage of 
time by communities as a result of recurring disasters, which more or less 
pulled these communities through. Is the extent and timing of a Saxon-based 
evolution of learning recognisable during the repeated high water disasters? 
This will be assessed later in the study, thus providing a further little piece in 
the mosaic of “historical natural disaster research”. 
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Historical high water research on Saxony 
In his comprehensive study, Stefan Militzer (1998) looks at high water disas-
ters between 1784 and 1799 in detail. One should remain critical of Militzer’s 
opinion that due to the fast recurrence of high waters in 1784/85 the state 
measures and private initiatives for disaster management had an ever-dimini-
shing effect. In his writings he stresses that one can detect a redirection from 
reactive to preventative measures (IBID.). 
Mathias Deutsch (2000) emphasises that state precautionary measures were 
implemented by the end of 1798. He includes the preparation of military units 
for ice-breaking and the implementation of an acoustic warning system with 
signal canons, which had been in work since 1784 (IBID., p.7-44;  
WEICHSELGARTNER 2003, p. 245-248; POLIWODA 2007). Backwaters 
resulting from ice on the Elbe occasionally led to extreme high waters which, 
together with ice-jams and burst dikes, led to extensive damage along the river. 
He looks at the measures instantly implemented on site (e.g. in Meißen) al-
though he does not compare these with those from 1784. 
Dieter Fügner (2002) examines a much larger timeframe. He looked through 
the records of Saxon high waters from 590 onwards (The Spangenbergs Mans-
felder Chronik) right through to summer 2002. His judgements on the so-
cial/political reactions and actions are accordingly brief in each case and he 
mainly deals with the historical event itself. Like Deutsch and Militzer, he too 
looks at the historical climate-related background before touching on the indi-
vidual disasters themselves. His details on the distribution and regularity of 
Elbe high waters are extremely reliable and very important in climatic-
historical terms. This applies in particular to the climate information, which he 
extracted from sources in Pötzsch and which is limited to the period from 1500 
to 1800 (FÜGNER 1987, p. 155-158). 
In 1848 Wilhelm Schäfer wrote his “Chronik der Dresdner Elbbrücke” in 
which he examines the damage to the Augustus bridge in Dresden as a result of 
each high water. He provides an historical Elbe level indicator and river 
marker, which he derived from the bridge office archive (SCHÄFER 1848). 
With the high waters recurring between 1784 and 1845 it was interesting to 
examine the verifiable development on various social levels. To this end the 
sequences depicted by Militzer, Deutsch and Fügner were brought together, 
and further reactions and evidence of successful learning were consequently 
questioned (POLIWODA 2007). 
Learning from disasters: Terms 
In order to show when, why and who learns from high water, two ‘definitions’ 
must be introduced first. The question posed is whether and in what way learn-
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ing is possible within a society, and what such learning comprises of. Further-
more, the extent to which history and the term learning process can be con-
nected with one another has to be examined. Dealing with the question “learn-
ing from disasters” requires the distinction between specific terms. This 
distinction differentiates between the ideas of learning steps, the learning proc-
ess and learning development or learning evolution. 
Learning can be defined as the skill in correcting available action templates, 
creating new templates and making adjustments in order to reflect changing 
circumstances. The terms “learning” and “learning process” are therefore often 
associated with a stringent definition. This view is put into perspective when 
one assigns the idea of the learning process to wider contexts (KNOEPFEL/ 
KISSLING-NÄF/ MAREK 1997, p. 274). Diverse and randomly connected 
factors may be required to initiate learning processes on the basis of singular 
and non-repeatable historical developments. However, both can be assumed in 
the case of an historical process: a certain degree of chance against a general 
essence of conformity as should be underlined by the learning in the Saxon 
community. 
Klaus Eder (1985) utilised the phrase “history and learning processes” in a 
causal context. He thinks that “up to the end of the eighteenth century the 
movement in enlightenment could be characterised by the education of society 
from above, that culture was diffused from the top down” (IBID., p. 129, trans-
lated Poliwoda). He touches on a paradigm shift. In modern terms the commu-
nication flow described is completely reversed. “Carriers of collective learning 
processes are now groups, which define themselves through the allowance of 
principally everyone to participate in group life in an equal measure” (IBID., 
p. 129f, transl. Poliwoda). In this context Eder posits a socialisation theory. The 
new bearers of political power were no longer legitimised by birth but instead 
by function (IBID., p. 357f.). 
Regarding the question of whether learning processes can be defined by an 
historical process, Eder takes a relative stance. “Learning processes are mecha-
nisms of an evolutionary development process. Within it a historical action 
relation is created, in which a new, normative orientation is practised and selec-
tively held on” (IBID., p. 477f., transl. Poliwoda). Thus learning processes are 
compartmentalised by their historical “was and is”. Not just the singularity but 
more essentially the relativity of historical formulations can thereby be expan-
dend to accommodate fundamental components.  
Hansjörg Siegenthaler examined periods of social crises on the basis of eco-
nomic cycles. He has been able to ascertain the existence of learning in regular 
confidence intervals as well as fundamental learning (SIEGENTHALER 1993). 
When referring to learning in regular confidence intervals, he points out the 
fact that improvements are made by using available templates during times of 
economic and political stability. In times of crisis however these templates are 
called into question and society is required to create new templates and rules. 
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This process he considers as fundamental learning. Crises therefore offer the 
option of abandoning the well-trodden pathways in order to discover new solu-
tions.  
Christian Pfister (2002) expanded upon Siegenthaler’s theory. He was able 
to show that natural disasters could also result in fundamental learning proc-
esses. In “Am Tag danach” he emphasises that the effects of natural disasters 
require innovative procedures (IBID., p. 240f.). Further studies by a whole 
range of disciplines show that natural disasters have resulted in improvements 
in public and private institutions (PASCHE 2002; MASSARD-GUILBAUD/ 
PLATT/ SCHOTT 2002; SCHOTT 2003; COEUR 2003b, p. 373-378; 
MÜLLER 2004; POLIWODA 2007). 
The assumption that individual natural disasters would result in social learn-
ing processes was contradicted by R. W. Kates (2000). He stresses that a mo-
mentum of repetition would be essential if learning processes were to be de-
tected. Kates demonstrates this fundamental point on the basis of high water 
catastrophes: “Floods need to be experienced, not only in magnitude, but in 
frequency as well. Without repeated experiences, the process whereby manag-
ers evolve emergency measures of coping with floods does not take place” 
(IBID., p. 8). There one must differentiate between learning steps and learning 
processes. Learning steps will be initiated after individual disasters and occa-
sionally after learning processes, too. A comprehensive cross-society learning 
development or evolution is likely after multiple events.  
The majority of publications to this day, which examine the history of natu-
ral disasters look specifically at single incidents. These incidents feature learn-
ing processes, without looking at the extent to which other social factors have 
led to these processes or indeed influenced them. A distinction between learn-
ing steps, learning processes and learning evolutions avoids this form of amal-
gamation. This “three-way breakdown” also tackles amalgamation and also 
deals with time differentiations and players, time periods and effects. Direct, 
indirect, short-term and long-term learning successes are hereby all illustrated. 
Denis Coeur (2003b) utilises the term “genesis” in the title of his publication 
“Genesis of a public policy for flood management in France” (IBID., p. 372). 
He thereby refers to the procedural measures implemented by the state and 
public as a result of high waters. The longer-term learning developments de-
scribed by him with the word “genesis” are affected by single (short-term) 
learning steps and mid to longer-term learning processes. It is only in the con-
text of these three different timeframes that one can speak of a “genesis” or a 
longer-term learning development/learning evolution. The term learning evolu-
tion shall be used hereafter to describe a longer-term, comprehensive and 
multi-layered social learning process. 
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The historical climate background between 1784 and 
1845 
The following timeframe functions as a basis for the entire examination. The 
regularity of winter floods between 1784 and 1845 can be considered as a clear 
climate signal (Dalton Minimum). One perceives importance not only in the 
period under examination, indeed the millennium flood of 2002 also emerges 
as a historical incident: 
















Source: POLIWODA, Guido/ PFISTER, Christian: Documentary data and the 
millennium flood of 2002 (<http://www.pages.unibe.ch/shighlight/archive03/ 
poliwoda.html>, accessed 22.11.2006). 
 
If the average temperatures shift to extremes, meaning hot or cold weather, 
then these will become more prevalent in the affected area. If one examines the 
winter temperatures in central Europe from the second half of the eighteenth 
century until 1830 then this synopsis of the average temperatures returns a 
negative result. The temperature sequence in Berlin between the 1780s and 
1790s lies at approximately 1.4 - 1.7 degrees Celsius below the Dahlem (dis-
trict of Berlin) average (1909-1969). This shift in the average temperatures in 
Saxony gave rise to weather extremes in the form of cold waves (to below 
minus 30 degrees Celsius). The same relation for the period up to 1845 could 
be substantiated by an ample compendium comprising diverse sources from the 
German-speaking world (POLIWODA 2007, p.51-58). In combination with a 
sudden onset of warm air came a renewed recurrence of high water disasters 
(ice floods), because the frozen rivers suddenly broke free and the ice which 
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accompanied their flows frequently caused build-ups. It remains to be said that 
every flood should be examined in its own right. Every flood will demonstrate 
its own meteorological, hydrological and social pattern even if comparable 
meteorological characteristics preceded the start of high waters which led to the 
specific extreme incident (RUDOLF/ RAPP 2003, p. 186). 
Counter-measures and learning steps in learning phase I: 
1784 to 1799 
Distinction is drawn between the terms learning steps, learning processes and 
learning evolution (long-term learning processes). Differentiation must also be 
made between the short-term learning steps and the mid-term learning proc-
esses. Here, the results of learning shall be presented in order to demonstrate 
what could be learned through the decades, how the phases build on one an-
other and why the phrase learning evolution is justified for the period under 
examination. 
Counter-measures 
The ice flood of 1784 threw Saxony into chaos. Meter thick ice floes cut 
through the rivers, fragments destroyed houses; boats which had been cut loose 
and timbers stored on the riverbanks were swept away by the flood tides, cut-
ting everything in their paths to tatters. Dams burst, mills, infrastructures and 
industries all along the river were destroyed, some villages sunk to their church 
spires under the icy floodwaters. Nine people died whilst the government in 
Dresden simply watched the events unfolding in paralysis. How did such a 
disaster come about? 
The eye-witness and scientist Pötzsch reported in 1784 that the temperatures 
dropped immediately before the ice break-up, and no one was able to anticipate 
such a destructive ice flow. The last flood of this magnitude in Saxony took 
place in 1655, and the lack of efficient defences and rescue mechanisms before 
and during the disaster were understandable. In the decades before 1784 
Saxony, unlike Austria, had not been confronted with disastrous high waters. 
Prior to 1784 rescue forces were able to put preventive defence strategies into 
operation, the lack of which would only become apparent in Saxony after the 
disaster had taken place. 
The result of this traumatic incident was the immediate implementation of 
counter-measures such as the elimination of ice from the fields by the military. 
In the days that followed the flood, the ruling prince of Saxony, Friedrich Au-
gust III, sent money to the affected areas for distribution by local officials to 
those individuals affected by the disaster. In acute emergency situations, such 
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as those in 1784 and 1799 the monarch personally visited the emergency re-
gions. Friedrich August III arranged this visit for the very first time as a sym-
bolic act, wishing to demonstrate the compassion of a nation to his suffering 
people. 
Fig. 2: Preventive hygiene regulations 
 
 
Source: DRESDEN, Stadtarchiv: RA CXVIII 72, 26.4.1785. 
 
In order to ensure that economic process did not grind to a complete halt, the 
streets and customs offices were put back into operation as quickly as possible. 
Direct financial assistance was given to those industries and manufacturing 
branches which were seen as being essential by the state, including for example 
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the textile and porcelain industries. Further immediate counter-measures were 
set on preventative hygiene regulations. Local officials were issued with re-
scripts, which they had to publish and implement in their immediate communi-
ties. 
In 1799 the Dresden council advised officials that they had to instruct state 
and public health officers to monitor health within affected areas. The hand-
book of hygiene regulations was published time and again throughout the pe-
riod under examination nearly without changes to its content. The next step 
towards overcoming disasters have been the construction measures imple-
mented in the destroyed towns and villages. In 1784 the state contributed al-
most 50 per cent of the money required for restoration. No subsequent disaster 
was met with such financial commitment from the state. Private contributions 
were mostly encouraged through state initiatives and supported relative distri-
bution across affected administrative bodies. In addition citizens with elevated 
social status placed appeals for funds in the newspaper of Leipzig. The essence 
of these appeals was that those inhabitants coming from the areas where the 
appeals originated, would also be those who were those most heavily affected. 
With contributions made only by the private sector it was possible to deter-
mine a considerable reduction of about 40 per cent from 1784 to 1799. Al-
though the damage caused by the flood in 1799 was greater than in 1784, not 
only state contributions but also private support measures (called up by the 
state) were reduced by around 20 per cent. In addition to the large-scale disas-
ters in 1784, 1785 and 1799, state and private support also assisted the citizens 
through the worst of the floods in 1792 and 1795. The ceaseless high waters 
resulted in a requirement for permanent financial support, which can be seen as 
the reason for this increasingly restrained commitment. 
The state was responsible for providing finance for the maintenance of dams 
and dikes on the navigable rivers. Increased spending was necessary here after 
1784 and thus the state attempted to relieve itself of this responsibility in some 
districts. In 1781 a law was drafted which would include new maintenance 
obligations for the river controls. In 1787, 1793 and 1799 the state parliament 
demonstrated that the ruling elector and the finance committee had in principle 
agreed on the spirit of the new decree: the rising costs for the maintenance and 
construction of river controls should from now on be borne by those who 
would gain from the direct use of them. The privileged classes and in particular 
neighbours of the Elbe would be required to make greater contributions in the 
future. 
The route towards consolidating the provision of Saxon state finance follow-
ing the seven-year struggle should not be endangered by the recurrence of high 
waters. This is where the struggle transcended into a longer-term learning proc-
ess. Before the new law was introduced it was acknowledged that the perma-
nent costs for maintaining the river controls could not be wholly deposited with 
the communities themselves. They would have to be given new financial op-
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tions. There was a risk that an over-burdening of the communities could lead to 
the state being forced to finance an escalating loss-making business. 
Learning steps 
In order to be better prepared for the recurrence of ice floods the top adminis-
trative level began to react preventatively from 1785 onwards. Administration 
workers were instructed often in warning citizens in good time and initiating 
preventative de-icing procedures. An increased preparation, vigilance and 
passing on of instructions centrally from Dresden were now expected of local 
officials. 
Scientists and laymen discussed possible preventative measures in maga-
zines and newspapers. The general consensus was that the Elbe riverbed should 
be freed of sandbanks, sand ridges, tree trunks etc., so that the ice would flow 
along the river more easily. Scientific commentators recommended a bridge 
construction, which could not be destroyed by subsequent ice floods. 
In 1804 general river regulations were discussed at the local administration. 
It was determined that corrective measures should be developed in the future. 
This shows that prior to 1800, regulations of the broadest kind were already 
applied to which the form of discussion described would have made a defini-
tive contribution. Likewise sources demonstrate measures planned for 1785, 
which would utilise the coming floodwater to remove sandbanks and ridges. 
However, this innovative thinking came to nothing due to excessive de-icing by 
the Elbe ships in the area around the Augustus Bridge in Dresden. 
Open to public discussion was the question whether it would be advisable 
for the military to detonate ice barriers, either by using artillery fire or through 
the application of incendiary devices. Such attempts were made not only in 
1784 but also in the 1770s, whereby they were seldom successful. If the ice 
moved at all then this was usually uncontrolled and led to damage to the infra-
structure. The learning step was made by putting the various applied defence 
strategies into perspective. Critical opinions dominated discussions and sources 
report little of such exploding commandos in the nineteenth century. 
Before a possible ice break-up the elector ordered the clearing of the so-
called “trails”, boarded routes across the ice. Those points where the trails were 
laid out were areas of thickly frozen ice, which would become ice barriers once 
the ice began to break down. These barriers would hold back the water and 
submerge entire strips of land. 
In order to avoid the pending disaster of a forthcoming flood, timber mer-
chants were required, through the issuance of many rescripts, to remove their 
logs from the banks of the Elbe. The disaster of 1784 saw the floodwaters lift 
meter-long logs and sweep them away, causing excessive damage in particular 
to wooden bridges. 
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It is possible to ascertain further learning steps in the February of 1785. An 
acoustic warning system consisting of cannons was installed along the banks of 
the Elbe, intended to sound a timely warning to the communities in the event of 
an ice break-up; there was also a rider relay system installed to support it. 
Work on the acoustic system had been underway since the previous year al-
though various writings from the nineteenth century suggest that the acoustic 
warnings rarely fulfilled their purpose. In 1820 water construction director 
Wagner spoke of the system as never being efficient. In Prussian Torgau the 
system was abandoned for good in the 1830s – for the same reasons. 
Boats for rescuing and evacuating individuals threatened by the water were 
also put in place. In 1799 the elector combined emergency relief and hygiene 
measures. Support of affected communities required interaction between offi-
cials and doctors, a system that would enable optimisation immediately after 
high waters. 
By 1800 local preventative measures had been considerably improved. As 
soon as water rose to the upper Elbe those towns situated on the river would 
send inspectors to the dikes. A dike attendant would organise a 24-hour inspec-
tion of the dike. Thus, an initial basis for implementing defensive measures due 
to predicted severe high waters was now in place, something, which was un-
precedented in German-speaking regions in this form. It is important also to 
note that the recurring momentum of high waters prior to 1800 did not only 
define financial limitations, but also vitally revealed potentials which would 
clearly be significant in the future if such disasters were to recur. The actual 
regime reacted in various ways to natural disasters. The state officials applied 
the options available to them in an increasingly routined manner. Available 
routes were extended and new ones were created. The officials adapted to the 
disaster by doing everything in their power to avoid chaos like that in 1784. 
The focal implementation of essential measures and prevention concepts 
was configured by the top administrative level until the turn of the century – 
the head of which was the Secret Finance Committee, the later Finance Minis-
try, which was solely responsible for providing compensation payments, for-
mulating reconstruction measures and improving the infrastructure. Until 1800 
the institutions considered themselves essentially to play a defensive role. 
Individual instructions and the flow of communication were delivered from 
above – from Dresden to the local officials on the periphery. The local level 
was held in the “absolutist grip” of the rescript instructions from Dresden. The 
extent to which this resulted in the innovative “dike-side” watches following 
the turn of the century can be assessed in the comments emanating from vari-
ous local officials, who criticised in particular the complex arrangement of 
bureaucracy left over from the Middle Ages. They complained that this led to 
an inability to clearly categorise the skills of officials, resulting for example in 
bank reinforcements varying on the basis of an individual’s discretion alone. 
Effects of the recurring momentum were seen particularly in financial efforts. 
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The commitment of the state and that of private contributors dropped alarm-
ingly and never succeeded in regaining the noteworthy sums of 1784. 
Counter-measures and learning steps in learning phase II: 
1800 to 1820 
Counter-measures 
Although until 1804 the floods did not reach truly catastrophic dimensions, this 
did not alter the strain on the state. Financial burdens resulting from high water 
damage were reported by local and higher officials, and these were mostly 
borne by the state. A construction project intended to repair and improve the 
dams in the so-called “Ostragehege” area of Dresden (1803, 1807-1809), can 
be taken as an example of the permanent nature of problems at hand. The Au-
gustus bridge in Dresden suffered damage between 1801 and 1803, which is 
detailed in the bridge office archive from 1848, contained in Schäfer´s com-
pendium. The dams and dikes throughout the electorate of Saxony were in such 
an appalling condition that comparable costs were incurred across every dike, a 
fact that was highly conspicuous given the financial problems related to bank 
defences and river controls in Graditz and Werdau in 1810/11. 
The format for financial compensation following the flood in 1804 was 
similar to that seen in the previous year. The private and state template re-
mained in place. The same applied to the maintenance of dams and dikes. The 
costs continued to be assigned to those areas which were to gain protection 
from the river defences. The de-icing of the Elbe in Dresden in 1805 had also 
been taken from the catalogue of measures utilised in the eighteenth century. 
The military received preventative instruction from the secret cabinet prior 
to the flood in 1809. The formulation “as otherwise done in similar cases”1, 
does not clearly indicate whether these measures refer to the floods in 1801 to 
1803, or to the period preceding this. It could be that, due to the severity of the 
floods in the 1780s and 1790s, this offensive application of the military (pre-
ventative instruction of the troops, option to command the local authorities in 
the event of flooding, every form of risk defence, assistance and rescue to those 
affected by the high water, distribution of units to those areas where the mili-
tary was not already stationed etc.) should in fact be assigned to the first coping 
and learning phase. 
                                                             
1 DRESDEN, Hauptstaatsarchiv: Loc. 5788: Acta die der bevorstehenden Eisfarth halber 
dem Militari ertheilte Anweisung betr. 1809, 1810, 1811. p.1a.: „wie in gleichen Fällen 
sonst geschehen“ (above transl. Poliwoda). 
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In January 1809 the King demanded “mutual communication”2 of the Dres-
den city council, and the police were deployed to the city with the task of im-
proving communications. The preventative measures and the exchange be-
tween the top and local levels of administration were becoming increasingly 
interactive in the period between 1804 and 1810. 
Learning steps 
In 1804 Saxony was hit by a summer flood. In contrast to the ice floods, which 
preceded it, the local authorities ensured that the banks were cleared of logs in 
good time (24 to 72 hours before the flood tides). Data acquired in 1785 was 
now utilised. The timbers had once been surrendered to the swirling chaos of 
the ice floods in the eighteenth century, but now all efforts were thrown into 
removing the logs from the water. Whilst in other areas the previous assump-
tion had been made that a 24-hour period would offer a sufficient margin of 
safety, in Pirna the officials had undercut this value. The area had suffered 
damage as a result of logs caught up in the floodwaters. This event enabled a 
subsequent calculation of the time taken for the floodwaters to reach affected 
locations. Corrective measures on the river itself were further implemented. 
Prior to 1800 ideas regarding river controls had been purely nature-driven. 
However, from 1804 onward the best possible measures were introduced on the 
basis of the specific characteristics of the river affected. 
Financial considerations came markedly to the fore from 1810. For the pe-
riod from 1771 to 1810 the Secret Finance Committee lamented maintenance 
costs for the dam sections in Graditz and Werdau (approximately three kilome-
tres of river) totalling 70,000 Thaler. This would not be a financial option in the 
future. An extrapolation of this figure would have given great cause for con-
cern, even if one were to assume that not every stretch of the river could incur 
such extensive costs. The entire Saxon stretch of the Elbe would have added 
costs in the range of ten million Thaler to the Saxon budget! If one adjusts the 
possible maximum value to between four and five million Thaler as a portion 
of the Saxon budget then one clearly comprehends the speedy, non-
bureaucratic, top-level management involved in the reduction of these costs. 
Initially it was planned that 31,000 Thaler would be provided for a tunnel 
through the Loswig Bush, so that dam breaks in Graditz and Werdau would not 
result in entire swathes of land being submerged under water. 
However, even this comparatively small sum caused difficulties. The 
amount was finally achieved via a mixed finance package in which tax exemp-
tions were agreed for those inhabitants in Graditz and Werdau who would stand 
to gain from the use of the river control measures. The recurring formulation, 
                                                             
2 DRESDEN, Stadtarchiv: RA CXVIII 76b: Acta, Die beym harten Winter, p. 97, 98: „wech-
selseitige Kommunikation“ (above transl. Poliwoda). 
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that the citizens would be held accountable for contributions [Quelle?] shows 
the viewpoint from which the fight against the Elbe floods was fought3. The top 
administrative level preventatively tackled the flooding of the Elbe not so much 
from a humanitarian as from an economical/political viewpoint. As stretched as 
the financial situation was in 1810, it is clear that the privileged classes eased 
the plight of the inhabitants of Belgern and Riesa following the flood in 1811. 
High water damage, which destroyed their properties for the third time, was 
met with contributions from precious funds. 






















Source: BERLIN, Geheimes Staatsarchiv: E 52.485 
 
The knowledge that the permanent costs had to be reduced and that those 
individuals behind the dikes could not be left alone to procure the requisite 
finance resulted in the idea of creating a dedicated fund. This form of fund 
would comprise of an annual contribution of 5,000 Thaler from the privileged 
classes, which matched with an identical contribution by the state. The pay-
ments would be made irrespective of whether river defences, tunnels etc. were 
constructed or not. This would result in an accumulation of monies. 
                                                             
3 DRESDEN, Hauptstaatsarchiv: Loc. 6539: Acta, Die Unterstützung der Grundbesitzer, P. 
17 b, 18 a. 
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The Elbe flow, bank and dam decree in 1819 saw the king and officials cre-
ate a law, which was intended to regulate every aspect affecting the Elbe. The 
fundamental essence of the decree was the intensified financial contribution of 
the Elbe neighbours in riverbank defences and dams. In addition to new finan-
cial regulations, from now on a dam administrator would organise arrange-
ments before, during and after high waters. The forms of organisation in place 
at the end of the eighteenth century had been extended and improved. From 
now on all districts neighbouring the Elbe were required to place dam monitors 
on the dams in the event of rising river levels. A mobilisation of all available 
powers was regulated by paragraph five. 
Prevention, measures and in particular financial systems had gained entirely 
new foundations by 1820. Structures had been created, which were intended to 
enable a systematic fight against problems and crises such as the spread of 
chaos and a financial overburdening of the state and its inhabitants. The second 
learning phase had been catalysed by the strained financial situation of the state 
budget and the calculations of the Secret Finance Committee, regarding the 
dike sections in Graditz and Werdau. 
From 1820 the administrative department of Saxony commanded that the 
police take up ice monitoring positions on the Elbe dams three days before an 
ice break-up. During their patrols, the police corresponded with the neighbour-
ing Elbe districts, and were required to report all changes in the water level, the 
ice flow and any damage to the dikes to the administrative department by 
horseback messengers. The police officials were also required not only to man 
the signal cannon and prepare the dikes, but also to instruct the people and 
inform them of the appropriate reactions to the cannon soundings. With the 
Elbe level rising, the forces began gathering at the affected locations around the 
dikes and dams. The dramatic defence measures surrounding the flood of 1820 
demonstrated the efficient ad hoc reactions of the local authorities. Likewise 
the administrative department of Saxony reacted in advance, prepared for the 
event that the dikes would not hold and entire swathes of land would be sub-
merged. Communication and assistance to areas cut off by flooding was guar-
anteed from 1820 onwards. 
The second phase culminated with the Elbe flow, bank and dam decree in 
1819. The Elbe neighbours did not entirely adhere to the law banning them 
from building their own dams, but an orientation a landmark was now in place 
and water construction director Wagner knew to build upon this with his 35- 
page report issued one year later. Wagner drew up this report following the 
flood in 1820, based in part on the experiences of local officials. The fact that 
warning signals were not issued from cannons in the manner detailed in litera-
ture from the eighteenth century can be taken from Wagner’s report as well as 
other writings. 
Statements made by Wagner and the Secret Finance Advisor von Zeschau, a 
member of the Financial Committee in Dresden, regarding improvements of 
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the disaster defences were becoming increasingly military. The weakness of 
individual dam defences, the private contributions made to them and the fact 
that disaster defences had still not run in an optimum manner could all be ex-
cuses for these military expressions. This tone also crept latently into annual 
announcements from 1826 – seen as comprehensive preventative measures – 
published across the state. 
In his report from 1820, Wagner delivered an “ideal.” The expert listed eve-
rything that would be necessary. Even though only a certain section of this list 
was to be implemented in the 1820s, important elements were adjusted, in 
particular using the Elbe flow, bank and dam decree, upon which one could 
subsequently build. The districts lying on the Elbe were combined to create 
dam communes in order to address the maintenance of the dams using a wider 
support mechanism. The Finance Committee set up dam funds into which the 
dam communes were required to pay an annual contribution, irrespective of 
whether defences were constructed or not. This was the final handing-over of 
the state’s obligations to the river defences from the government to the Elbe 
communities. 
The bank defence commission selected a dam administrator from the dam 
communes, responsible for ensuring that the rescue team was alerted, material 
for dam security was made available and messages were sent to the neighbour-
ing districts. The new decree meant that the neighbouring districts were now 
also legally responsible for defence against disaster. It was not possible to 
create any judicial conformity in the period immediately after 1819. The con-
tinued general construction of individual dams restricted further learning proc-
esses, which would have been important in the stringent progression of regula-
tion work on the Elbe. 
With regard to institutions, both Torgau (which was forcibly ceded to Prus-
sia after the Vienna Congress) and Dresden had a water construction director-
ate in 1811, which was subordinate to the Secret Finance Committee. The 
water construction director was in charge of the technical officials and water 
construction department, in which the borough leaders of administration were 
represented. This guaranteed that the three levels involved all dealt with district 
business as a “network”. This resulted in the suggestions from the administra-
tive department following the flood in 1820. They felt themselves compelled to 
cooperate more actively in the process, as they were more strongly connected 
with it. One such suggestion was the creation of raised areas and emergency 
stoves so that bottlenecks could not prevent the administering of aid following 
high waters. 
The learning steps in the first phase were transferred into a learning process. 
Learning in terms of prevention, measures and the forms of previous coping 
strategies had been built upon. Clear improvements, particularly in prevention 
in both ad hoc and sustainable areas (finance / Elbe flow, bank and dam decree) 
had been achieved. In addition to these not insignificant steps, it is also appar-
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ent that there was an acceptance that damage assessment and health care meas-
ures were associated with one another. This acceptance enabled the state offi-
cials to get a more efficient and faster assessment of the situation and thereby 
organizing an improved reaction in extreme circumstances. 
Institutional improvements were implemented in the run up to the new de-
cree. From 1811 water construction directorates in Torgau and Dresden worked 
with experts to investigate the high water issue in detail. In addition, water 
construction directors and local officials in the administration worked together 
with the districts. The costs of increased control of the rivers were transferred 
to the users. Funds, dam funds and the regulations of the new law created en-
tirely new instruments with which to carry the permanent (not only financial) 
excessive strains. 
Learning steps in learning phase III: 1820 to 1845 
From 1826 an announcement was issued before every ice flood, containing the 
most important of Wagner’s principles, which were detailed in the learning 
steps from the last decade. The number of signal cannons and the police posts 
along the Elbe were increased. The actions of the inhabitants along the Elbe 
were governed by an optimised catalogue, which precisely instructed them pre, 
during and post disaster. 
The region of Torgau, Prussian from 1815, had also begun to accept an-
nouncements in preparation for disaster defence. The two publications were 
similar not only in content but also in terms of their military style. The learning 
input collated for the Wagner report came to a great extent from the local offi-
cials. They were the ones who witnessed the requirements for improvement at 
local level during an ice flood. 
The state-wide announcements, published from 1826, channelled the previ-
ous learning steps into a comprehensive specification of actions for implemen-
tation before, during and after high water. The learning development which 
enabled this considerable improvement in the mechanisms of coping with dis-
aster must be attributed to the lower administrative levels. It was from here that 
the learning pulses were emitted, which influenced an overall disaster man-
agement up to 1845. Wagner integrated the recommendations of local officials 
into his report to the finance committee. The announcement of 1826 included a 
large number of these recommendations, such as the optimising of signal shots 
and the inclusion of the Elbe flow, bank and dam decree. 
This optimised the behaviour of the inhabitants living on the Elbe before, 
during and after a high water disaster. This third phase should become the 
decisive one. The learning steps in phases one and two were integrated into the 
measure catalogue so that it is possible to speak of a form of disaster manage-
ment. With his report, Wagner delivered a matrix, which then simply required 
implementing. 
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Fig. 4: Public announcement 
 
 
Source: DRESDEN, Stadtarchiv: RA CXVIII 76b. 
 
In 1835 the people of Dresden founded a rescue association. The aim of the 
association was not only to save peoples’ lives during high waters, but also to 
save the belongings of those directly affected by the ice floods. From 1836 it 
had become possible in Dresden to estimate what levels of the Elbe would 
flood which areas of the city. A “risk card” was developed using the experi-
ences of non-destructive floods from the previous decades. This enabled a 
preventative and more efficient use of emergency services. 
Between 1838 and 1840 the administrative departments continued to pro-
vide further recommendations on how to improve disaster management. The 
fact that there was extensive compliance with this adopted form of precaution-
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ary announcement is reflected in an outstanding phase of coping, in which the 
Saxon communities worked to prepare themselves and achieved a level of fully 
acceptable disaster management in 1845. 




































Source: DRESDEN, Stadtarchiv: RA GXXII 89c Vol. I. 
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Communication between the cannon stations, the police and the main town 
did not fall apart in 1845. During the flood, police and local officials continued 
to send messages to the borough offices in Dresden, where defence coordina-
tion was taking place. This guaranteed reactions to the changes in the ice flows 
and water levels and ensured that defence measures would be optimised ac-
cordingly during high waters. 
Officials in the city applied newly obtained knowledge together with infor-
mation gained through many decades of experience. Military, material and 
police forces were positioned at critical points in the city at the right times, so 
that work was carried out with due thought and consideration as the Elbe rose. 
Everything possible was done for the people. The inhabitants of Dresden 
praised the organisation even during the disaster: “Everywhere and with in-
creasing danger there was order, peace and trust in the insight of the truly fa-
therly authorities.”4. 
Although the consequences of the flood in 1845 were more successfully 
overcome than those of previous floods, the borough administrator Marbach 
and the imperial ministry summoned a crisis management committee. This 
crisis management committee comprised of the interior minister or his repre-
sentative, a member of the war office, the borough administrator, the mayor 
and the police chief for Dresden, and the head of the first administrative de-
partment. They were required to meet before any future flood, to centrally 
advise and agree on the necessary measures. 
Summarised characteristics of the learning evolution 
The entire Saxon community applied itself directly or indirectly to the issue of 
high waters. If the structure of the state is examined then one sees a vertical 
penetration across the complete timeframe. This vertical penetration manifests 
itself through a range of coping mechanisms such as cash contributions, disas-
ter defences, health care etc., or the continued implementation of measures 
such as de-icing the areas preceding the bridges using the millers or fishermen, 
or with the Elbe ships. 
It is possible to discern constant and reflexive learning by the time measures 
were combined to create one step (health care was integrated into emergency 
aid in 1799), and one can ascertain this learning characteristic over the com-
plete period under examination. A vertical ability to react, which was imple-
mented immediately after 1784 (whereby laymen were also publishing im-
provement recommendations) was not only a central but also a consistent 
theme which ran right through to the flood of 1845.  
                                                             
4 „Überall war bei steigender Gefahr, Ordnung, Ruhe und Vertrauen auf die Einsicht der 
wahrhaft väterlichen Behörde.”; DRESDEN, Stadtarchiv: RA GXXIV 75; transl. Poliwoda. 
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The Saxon state budget was existentially threatened by the recurring high 
waters. Local measures could not prevent waters breaking through the dikes 
and the monetary support from the districts and communes became dispropor-
tionate when compared to the state. At the end of the eighteenth century the 
monarchy financed an extensive proportion of the damage costs, but in the 
nineteenth century the state finally relinquished this responsibility and left the 
costs of damage to be met by those affected. Disagreements over finance, as 
witnessed in Ihleburg, Graditz, Werdau and Canitz, showed that the “new offi-
cials” pursued the reformed financial system at the lowest level. A smoothing 
out of the hierarchy was underway. The bottom, middle and top administrative 
levels were all involved in this process. The introduction presented Eder’s 
socialisation theory regarding history and learning processes, a theory which 
was substantiated in the transition from the eighteenth to the nineteenth cen-
tury; he also described a levelling of the hierarchies and new officials (EDER 
1985, p. 357f.). 
Financial coping was supported by a broader base. Towns and districts were 
henceforth required to fund preventative and additional costs. This system 
reform can be evaluated as a mark of the start of the socialist society. 
The attitude towards disasters changed from 1800. High waters were no 
longer considered as plagues. The local officials attempted to avert catastrophic 
results preventatively at the dikes. This was developed by officials in situ. They 
provided the water construction director Wagner with their experience and 
advice and he went on to present this to the Secret Finance Committee. At the 
beginning of the new century this process reversed the flow of disaster defence 
information. Thus the year 1800 can be seen as a turning point both in terms of 
coping mechanisms as well as the resulting learning steps. Until the turn of the 
century the local officials were required to follow the instructions and rescripts 
issued by Dresden. In the first decades of the new century, their recommenda-
tions were being included in the disaster catalogue, and from 1826 this became 
a form of announcement distributed across the state. 
Until the formulation of a constitution (1831) Saxony’s administration was 
dominated by the restorative policies of the Cabinet Minister von Einsiedel, 
supported by the king. The existing contradictions between the ruling policies 
and the increasing strength of society were clearly apparent. Other characteris-
tics can also be attached to the disaster management: the reversal of the flow of 
information from bottom to top resulted in disaster management being increas-
ingly transferred into the hands of civilians. The result was a socialisation, 
which vertically permeated higher levels of administration. 
The officials optimised the disaster defences before, during and after the in-
cident (people, materials). This took place with a “hardened coping” (military 
tone of the announcements, legal implications upon refusal, application of the 
military and trained forces). 
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With this ‘mobilisation’ the players in mid-level administration enforced a 
networked disaster communication across all layers. They implemented their 
ideas in orders and decrees. Officials, the administration, the military, districts 
and communes communicated and organised high water prevention, defences 
and follow-up measures together from the 1820s onwards – as a network. Hier-
archies (for the attainment of improved defences) were levelled by this new 
form of communication. From 1826 one can speak of a sectorally-networked 
disaster management, in which the players worked together. After 1820 and the 
Wagner report, the reflexive learning elements gained in strength (those de-
manded by Schanze as a result of the 2002 flood), not only because the infor-
mation flow had transferred from bottom to top, but also because all contribu-
tory levels were interacting with one another. From the 1820s one can discern 
that “self-supporting, cooperative learning processes for a lasting coevolution 
with territory specific high water risks” were aimed at; this was achieved by 
“continuous and reflexive learning” (SCHANZE 2002, p. 253, transl.  
Poliwoda).] 
Until 1800 it was essentially the officials and nobility in Dresden that organ-
ised and determined defence measures. After 1800 these key functions were 
transferred to the local officials who could now act with greater impulse – in 
particular from the second half of the 1820s. The continuous improvement in 
disaster management resulted from the learning steps and learning processes of 
local officials. 
Following the disaster in 1845, Saxony had access to a state-wide an-
nouncement which preceded the onset of high waters, a risk card for Dresden 
and a crisis management committee, together providing it with a modern disas-
ter management system. In six decades (of which two were intensively utilised) 
the Saxon administration had learned not only how to cope with the disastrous 
ice floods, but how to preventatively defend itself against them. The Saxon 
learning evolution, in particular in the period between 1820 and 1845, repre-
sents an astonishing portrayal of the demands of Schanze in 2002, after which 
improved high water risk measures gave rise to a change from high water pro-
tection to high water risk management. Planned intervention in order to reduce 
uncertainties was apparent in all phases of learning (MILLER 2002, p. 43). 
If the question is raised whether this learning evolution evolved more from a 
trust in regulations/ routines or a fundamental/ intensified learning, then one 
encounters long statements such as those formulated by Siegenthaler (1993). 
He does not assume a recurring disaster momentum. He considers that individ-
ual crises offer the opportunity to put processes in place, which would other-
wise not be made available to a society. In his opinion, the period prior to the 
turn of the century was such a time, and that the decades immediately thereafter 
were in fact the shock-free decades which accelerated the learning evolution – 
with greater force than the impacts of 1784 and 1799. In this respect, the learn-
ing gained with the hardship of each flood did not accumulate immediately, 
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even though the floods of 1820, 1830 and 1845 can be seen as amplifiers for 
the existence of the learning evolution. In all three learning phases both routine 
and intensified learning can be ascertained. Fundamental/intensified learning 
was increasingly transposed into learning based on trust in regulations/routines, 
although the resultant learning exhibits a fundamental character. High waters 
became normality, just as it was ‘normal’ to act against them in as systemati-
cally as possible – because the institutions assumed no later than 1827 that the 
floods were not about to cease occurring. The degree to which the results were 
fundamental can be deduced from the fact that the Prussians went also through 
a “phase of announcements” and advanced with comparable results and innova-
tions. 
A sober handling of disasters is a central theme, which runs through the en-
tire period under examination. The ice floods were not suffered – they were 
survived. This basic strategy was prevalent in all three phases. Penal-
theological interpretations could not be found. After the disaster in 1784 an 
increasing number of sermons were held, although these did not follow a uni-
form pattern but merely promoted recurrent ideas of solidarity. 
The state was required to reduce the short-term and long-term costs and had 
begun to successively transfer the burden of diverse costs to the beneficiaries of 
regulatory measures by 1819 at the latest. It attempted, insofar as possible, to 
eliminate the short-term costs through the implementation of an improved 
disaster management as shown with the announcements from 1826. The better 
the prevention and disaster management provided, the lower the costs incurred. 
From 1781 work began on the Elbe flow, bank and dam decree. This was 
given legal form in 1819, and in the following year Wagner presented details of 
the actions of the inhabitants before, during and after the high waters to the 
highest level of administration. This innovation resulted from experiences of 
the ice flows on the dikes and in the districts, which had been gained by local 
officials, prior to, during and after the floods. This cumulative permanence, 
with which one could tackle subsequent floods, was the key to achieving a 
systemization phase, which was intended to cumulate in the 1830s and 1840s, 
and all of this promised a cost minimisation for the strained Saxon state budget. 
Additionally came the non-contribution of the state to direct flood victim aid. 
Only in 1784 did state and private restitution cover 50 per cent of the cost of 
damages. Thereafter, the state and/or private support never reached such high 
proportions again. In 1845 the state considered it adequate that private dona-
tions alone covered approximately 30 per cent (possibly a little more). In both 
the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the remaining damages were handed 
over by the state for private self-regulation. This may sound reductive, but 
financial aspects dominated events. 
A long-term reduction in costs was to be achieved through non-contribution 
to costly dam construction. It was not without reason that this subject became a 
regular focus for disputes, respective denials of responsibility and the centre of 
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quarrels, in which various factions attempted to avoid the costs for de-icing, the 
provision of footbridges etc. These differences could not be attributed to spe-
cific administrative levels alone; indeed at times all those from the lord of the 
manor right through to the king were involved. 
The learning evolution described peaked in an extensively enhanced man-
agement from 1845. This must surely be looked at in an additional time horizon 
as for example the year 1861, commonly referred to as the threshold in which 
far-reaching Elbe legislation was passed – which can be attributed to the catas-
trophic floods prior to 1845. 
Technophobia, originally acquainted with high industrialisation, became as-
sociated with high waters from 1845. Doubts went round in newspapers, as to 
the extent to which previous river controls had in fact caused the 1845 high 
waters and revealed a modernist character. The fact that people experienced 
ambivalence towards the technical innovations which were increasingly domi-
nating their lives, underlined the modern risks (ecological problems), which 
were arising from sustained intervention into the natural world. 
In order to improve coping strategies with recurring ice floods the entire 
administrative apparatus would need to pull in one direction. The Secret Fi-
nance Committee and the subsequent Finance Ministry (from 1831), were 
particularly responsible for dictating the direction in which developments were 
to head, and to what extent and how quickly river controls, tunnels, compensa-
tion payments etc. could or should be implemented. 
The innovations in the first decades of the nineteenth century resulted from 
ageing of the local administrative levels. Their ideas and recommendations 
resulted in innovations in local management, which were included in Wagner’s 
report and in the announcements, which were made during the decades that 
followed. This can be related to Max Millers (2002) definition of a learning 
process: “A learning process and some outcomes of a learning process can only 
be attributed to a group of human beings if at least a majority of the individuals 
members constituting that group can be said to have performed that learning 
process” (IBID., p. 20). In the case of Saxony, the ‘group’ described by Miller 
comprises of both the local officials and the water construction directorate. 
They established the learning process. Through diligent work and improve-
ment, the water construction director and the local officials initiated decisive 
learning pulses, which were emitted across the board, culminating in cumula-
tive learning processes. These can be seen as system reforms, as a “process, in 
which a new social coordinate system […] and competence in handling the new 
circumstances could be achieved”5. 
The implemented learning evolution is remarkable and demonstrates how a 
society is able to cope successfully with a climate trend that has a negative 
                                                             
5 „[...] Prozeß, in dem ein neues gesellschaftliches Koordinatensystem gleichzeitig geschaf-
fen und die Kompetenz im Umgang mit den neuen Verhältnissen erworben werden konn-
te.“ HATER 1998, p. 19; transl. Poliwoda. 
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impact upon it. The modern treatment of ever-recurrent crises situations was 
accompanied by modern, self-fabricated risks. The control of the Elbe exhib-
ited knock-on effects in 1845. Debate ensued after the flood, attempting to 
assess the extent to which habitations had been built on flood plains – the ex-
tent to which the control of the Elbe had actually strengthened the high waters 
that followed. Conversely, the Saxony administration learnt nothing from these 
modern deliberations – it would appear that the pressure, which had enabled 
the learning evolution in the previous years, was thereafter not yet sufficiently 
large for this degree of risk. 
The outlook: The 1784-1845 learning evolution compared to the 
DKKV study “Lessons Learned” 2002 
Under the patronage of Irmgard Schwaetzer and renowned scientists such as 
Uwe Grünewald, the DKKV (Deutsches Komitee für Katastrophenvorsorge; 
German Committee for Disaster Management) published a study in 2003, of 
which the title was “Hochwasservorsorge in Deutschland, Lernen aus der 
Katastrophe 2002 im Elbegebiet”. (“High water prevention in Germany. Learn-
ing from the 2002 disaster in the Elbe region”). 
Fundamental to the thesis presented in this examination is the assumption 
that the deficits demonstrating [demonstrated] in the study as existing in to-
day’s disaster management were formerly equally [were equally] existent in the 
period under assessment (1784-1845), although these could be relatively effi-
ciently remedied. This comparativeness is evident from the first chapter of the 
DKKV study. With regards to the high waters from 1997 on the Oder, and 
2002 on the Elbe, the study states that: “Not only in those affected they unset-
tled the confidence in the security of their living conditions and in the reliabil-
ity of for example political and institutional bodies responsible for the protec-
tion against high waters and underlined how much our highly technical and 
organised society is vulnerable to the extreme hazards of nature”6. 
The uncertainty of a large proportion of the population can be seen as hav-
ing acted as a considerable momentum and trigger for the successful coping 
and clear learning effects of the floods between 1784 and 1845. As early as the 
period following the initial incident in 1784 it is evident that even laymen were 
publishing suggestions regarding defence against high waters. The differentia-
tion voiced by Siegenthaler, in ascertaining that the time of uncertainty exhib-
ited a greater learning effect (fundamental learning), aligns with this connex-
                                                             
6 „Sie erschütterten, nicht nur bei den direkt Betroffenen, das Vertrauen in die Sicherheit ihrer 
Lebensumstände sowie in die Zuverlässigkeit z. B. politisch und institutionell Verantwortli-
chen für den Schutz vor Hochwasser und verdeutlichten, in welch hohem Maße unsere 
hochtechnisierte und hochorganisierte Gesellschaft anfällig gegen extreme Naturgefahren 
ist.“; DKKV 2003, p. 8, transl. Poliwoda. 
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ion. If one examines the end point of the learning evolution then the opposite of 
uncertainty can be seen7. 
This quote is confirmed by the weaknesses in disaster management in 2002 
shown by Schanze. In 1845 the preceding, comprehensive learning steps and 
learning processes had culminated in a learning evolution, for which the popu-
lation praised the authorities even in the face of the flood. The fundamental 
conclusions of the DKKV study show a failing in cooperation at both regional 
and central levels: “The present study shows that neither at prevention nor at 
coverage of high water disasters in Germany the necessary degree of coopera-
tion, communication and management existed. Both lack sufficient collabora-
tion between expertise, administration and regional borders, particularly be-
yond the borders of the federal states”8. 
Cooperation between the affected authorities in the period under examina-
tion began back in 1784 and continued to grow in strength right through to 
1845, resulting in the formulated crisis management group, of which the repre-
sentative of the Ministry for the Interior and the War Ministry were an inherent 
part. Cooperation (sometimes with identical instructions for the inhabitants) is 
documented for Saxony and Prussia, and also for Saxony and Bohemia. 
Likewise the assertion that one must eliminate a lack of clarity regarding re-
sponsibilities, in order to achieve clearer affiliation of skills and instructions, 
can be directly aligned with the Saxon learning evolution. The aged organisa-
tion of administration at the end of the eighteenth century led to a comparable 
criticism from the local officials. From the introduction of the Elbe flow, bank 
and dam decree in 1819 the organisation was placed on structured foundations, 
which could be built upon in the decades which followed, and from 1845 the 
district director in Dresden coordinated the counter-measures across the entire 
state. 
In the field of action provisions, the study demanded a checklist through 
which the necessary materials could be made available in the event of a disas-
ter. In the eighteenth century the materials were positioned in central locations 
and the announcements from 1826 onwards instructed the inhabitants to have 
everything required for an emergency on hand. 
After the flood in 2002 private households were surveyed in order to estab-
lish the extent to which those affected knew how to act with the instructions 
from the authorities. 40 to 50 per cent of those asked could not implement the 
regulations (DKKV 2003, p. 20). Up to the 1820s the population did not under-
stand the meaning of the cannon signals. The announcements/action regulations 
                                                             
7 See above note 4. 
8 „Die vorliegende Studie zeigt, dass weder bei der Vorsorge noch bei der Bewältigung von 
Hochwasserkatastrophen in Deutschland das erforderliche Maß an Kooperation, Kommuni-
kation und Führung vorhanden ist. Bei beiden mangelt es an ausreichendem Zusammenwir-
ken über Fach-, Verwaltungs- und Raumgrenzen, insbesondere über Bundesländergrenzen 
hinweg.“; DKKV 2003, p. 11, transl. Poliwoda 
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published and distributed across the states from the 1820s optimised the behav-
iour of inhabitants before, during and after a high water incident. 
Possibly the most focal point of the problem, finance, can also be compared 
in the past and current circumstances: “The time-consuming and financially 
demanding repair of the dikes must be complimented by consistent dike main-
tenance and preventive planning and control with consideration of the focal 
factor of disaster precautions”9. Analogies can be drawn to underline this quote 
right from 1781 through to the final phase of the learning evolution. The transi-
tion from state maintenance of the dikes to private contributions would be 
comparable today given a recurring momentum of disasters. Additionally, 
longer pre-warning periods were demanded, with the inhabitants receiving an 
initial warning by siren (DKKV 2003, p. 31). Both are measures, which were 
implemented following the first and second learning phases. The signal shots 
from 1785 and the storm bells which sounded once the dikes were unable to 
hold, reflect today’s demands. 
The same applies to the risk cards, which were intended to enable an estima-
tion of anticipated water levels. From 1836 these risk cards were in use in 
Dresden where they assisted considerably in optimising disaster management 
in 1845. Modern risk cards were demanded in the new Saxon water legislation 
from the 1st September 2004 for communes at risk along the Elbe and which 
they have to produce in the future (REY 2004, p.7). The recommendations 
from local officials, incorporated into the ever-growing action regulations from 
1820, are today required in the form of „Nachbereitung des Ereignisses” (“in-
cident debriefings”) (DKKV 2003, p. 32). A learning of individuals on the dike 
is an unavoidable element in improving arrangements before, during and after a 
high water disaster. 
It is clear from the examination that one fundamental aspect requires recon-
sidering. In the chapter “Terms” I wrote of history and learning processes that: 
Diverse and randomly connected factors may be required to initiate learning 
processes on the basis of singular and non-repeatable historical developments. 
However, both can be assumed in the case of an historical process: a certain 
degree of chance against a general essence of conformity, as should be under-
lined by the learning in the Saxon community. This applies in equal measures 
to the learning processes, which followed the flood of 2002. The discussion 
should therefore include the question of whether and to what extent one can 
learn from history. This is not the place in which to discuss this apparently 
philosophical question in detail.  
In final conclusion it is essential to comment one last time on the sectoral 
linking of individual action levels from 1826. Back then, today’s “mangelnde 
                                                             
9 „Die zeit- und finanzaufwändige Instandsetzung der Deiche ist durch konsequente Deichun-
terhaltung und vorsorgende Planungen und Bewirtschaftung unter Berücksichtigung der 
Gesichtspunkte der Katastrophenvorsorge zu ergänzen.“ ; DKKV 2003, p. 27, transl.  
Poliwoda. 
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Verbundenheit der korporativen Katastrophenschutzakteure” (“lacking connec-
tion between the cooperative disaster protection agents”) (DKKV 2003, p. 10f., 
transl. Poliwoda) was the subject of considerable focus and effort on the part of 
the Saxon administration. The successes witnessed then could be repeated 
today, although the extent to which a recurring momentum is required for this 
is, and remains, an unknown quantity. 
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